Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 22, 2020

Earth Day 2020 - Let the Earth heal!

Image source: Google Image Search
One thing is certain... The nature heals itself. A few weeks of lockdown and the earth is returning back to its old glory light-speed. People have seen and they are posting pics of clear blue skies during the day and sparkling stars during the night. A few nights ago, I and my teenage daughters stood outside watching constellations in the sky. She confessed that she was seeing the Orion, the most easily spotted constellation for the first time in her life... FOR THE FIRST TIME... It struck me because it was a very common passtime for us as kids to stand on the terrace and watch constellations and joke how an Orion could even be imagined as a hunter. But a teenager today was able to spot it for the first time. She had never seen the pole star so bright, something we couldn't even dismiss as a kid.

And why just the sky? We are receiving beautiful pics of clean rivers like Ganga and Yamuna; of clean Venice Canals; of Dolphins visible near Italian beeches; of beautiful clean waters near Goan beeches. We see all kinds of birds chirping in our gardens now, thriving among empty parks and open spaces. And today it has been just one month of closure of factories. The air quality had jumped 4 levels on the index within the first week itself, from "Very Unhealthy" (scale 5 out of 6 levels) to "Moderate" (scale 2 out of 6 levels). One can feel the difference when they breathe out in the open already.

The truth is that no matter how many environment friendly policies we make; how many vehicle emission standards we draft; we will never be able to fully heal the environment unless we give up our selfish economic motifs. The governments of the nations are drafting "Sustainable Development Goals" - which includes goals around climate and environment among others - with a deadline of year 2030 which, going by the current progress, most countries are likely to miss or achieve only on papers; led by some of the most developed nations. And yet we now know that we may not even need the governments to draft special policies to save the environment, to clean the rivers or reduce pollution. We just need to leave the environment alone for a few weeks at a stretch and halt our economic activities during this time to help it revive.

But then I am reminded of the movement carried out by Greta Thunberg who rightly claims that the selfish economic gains of humans are killing the environment. And the leaders are only supporting them with their policies. Today, on "Earth Day", I wonder whether the world leaders will ever have the guts to decide that every year for few weeks, we will chuck all economic and financial motifs and move into complete lockdown, not to counter some virus, but rather to let earth rest, heal and revive. Maybe not, but if only!

Friday, October 17, 2014

A different viewpoint: Of Flipkart sale and Bang Bang review

I haven't written for my blog for a while. The truth is, I have been involved in something else I had taken up. Something that I intend to reveal in a while. But, I would briefly catch up on two recent happenings that made me think a bit. I have a small viewpoint on the Flipkart Sale and the film reviews that Bang Bang received after it's worldwide release.


Much has been said and written about the Flipkart sale. Most of it is pure backlash. While I do feel that they could have planned better, in terms of better anticipating the demand, and accordingly worked around stock availability and server capacity etc., I do not agree with all the insinuations around cheating the customers w.r.t. to the product prices (i.e. the viewpoint whereby customers are creating a furore that Flipkart first increased the prices and then offered discounts). I mean, what did you expect? At the end of the day, they are here to do business and not charity. Who would sell at a loss? To be fair to them, they did not 'increase' the prices of the product; all they did was remove all discounts previously offered and bring the prices up to the MRP level in line up of their 'big billion day sale' when they eventually applied fresh new discounts, which in most cases were equal to if not higher than the previous discounts. Now, what is so wrong with that? Why is that unfair? Wasn't it pretty obvious that it would happen? Don't ordinary retailers and shopkeepers do the same before any sale? They too often remove all previous discounts just before the sale? They sometimes even remove the products from the current collection / stock in the hope of selling it at higher than normal prices after the sale? Why should Flipkart be any different? Just because online market is open 24x7 and the customers have access to other sites that do great business by keeping track of prices at various online retail sites by running an algorithm and no further effort of physically collecting data, is it okay to single out an online retailer for doing exactly what other retailers in the market do on a regular basis? The important part is that they did give huge discounts and whoever managed to get the products they needed, wanted or desired, cannot complain. (On a side note, I liked how Snapdeal was ready and prepared with counter-advertising - very interesting.)


Another happening in the media and the social networks lately was the cringe-worthy film reviews received by the movie 'Bang Bang'. The film which until its release was being hailed and touted as one of the biggest and most-looked-forward-to film of the year 2014, primarily due to its good-looking lead pair of Hrithik Roshan and Katrina Kaif and their previously loved chemistry in 'Zindagi na milegi dobara'; was eventually the recipient of the choicest lambasting by the so-called film critics. Almost all film critics went overboard in writing how the film had no plot and only boasted of the stylized performance and chemistry of the lead couple; and that at least half of this couple (read Katrina Kaif) was only eye-candy and did not having any acting to boast of. Now, if I may question these critics, what were they expecting in the first place? 'Knight and Day', of which makers had formally and very candidly declared it to be an official remake of, was effectively at best a mediocre film with no plot at all and just a good-looking couple (Tom Cruise and Cameron Diaz) exuding great chemistry, dreamy romance and some great stunts. Well, 'Bang Bang' had all that and an icing on the cake in the form of breathtakingly awesome dancing by Hrithik Roshan. Oh man! does he dance? The makers' marketing strategy too was all about promoting the hot lead pair with their screen chemistry romancing dreamily in exotic locations; some slick stylized stunts and Hrithik's great dance moves. So, again, did the critics expect Siddharth Anand et al to cook up a story for 'Bang Bang'? In that case, it wouldn't really have been the remake of 'Knight and Day' because the latter at least did not have a story to boast of. In fact, many of the sequences in 'Bang Bang' were a straight lift from 'Knight and Day' like Katrina being given injection shots which made her tell the truth despite putting her in a topsy turvy state; or Hrithik taking Katrina in front on his bike so that she could shoot the goons following them; or even Hrithik assuming a new identity and leaving his family behind to take up this mission and then secretly sending them money making his Dad believe he has won some lottery he did not even remember buying a ticket for; etc. As for Katrina, I wonder whether these critics were expecting her to come up with an Oscar winning performance. Well, looking at her filmography till date, I am just curious to know which of her films actually raised such hopes in the critics. Let's just be honest: Katrina cannot "act" and the film-makers do not hire her to "act". She is just supposed to look good standing next to the popular 'heroes' of her films who have the responsibility of carrying the film on their broad and strong shoulders. If they needed a 'heroine' who could "act", they would have gone for Vidya Balan but they didn't because they only needed their 'heroine' to look hot in a multi-neon shade monokini in a swimming pool or in a bikini top with a skimpy backless lace dress standing next to the gorgeous topless 'hero' who also can "act" well. 'Bang Bang' was only about two gorgeous good-looking actors and slick action. Period.

But, why do film critics always have to comment and harp about the 'plot' all the time, anyway? Do we really want all movies to have great stories and serious performance oriented lead actors playing complex dark real characters that make us think? No. Different movies serve different purposes. Some tell great stories and showcase great performances (e.g. Black and more recently Haider); some are great edge-of-the-seat thrillers with gravity defying stunts (e.g. Dhoom or Singham series); some are supposed to tickle our funny bone (e.g. Andaz Apna Apna); some are pure romance (e.g. Veer Zaara); some are only showcasing great locales (e.g. Chalte Chalte); and yet some are just pure mindless entertainers (e.g. Dabang or any of Salman Khan or Farah Khan movies). If all movies were serious plot based or social awareness based movies made to please the critics and get nothing less than a rating of 4/5 from them, I think, we the viewers would soon loose interest in movies. Variety, as they say, is the spice of life.

Wednesday, October 1, 2008

How Financial Madness Overtook Wall Street

By Andy Serwer and Allan Sloan

If you're having a little trouble coping with what seems to be the complete unraveling of the world's financial system, you needn't feel bad about yourself. It's horribly confusing, not to say terrifying; even people like us, with a combined 65 years of writing about business, have never seen anything like what's going on. Some of the smartest, savviest people we know — like the folks running the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board — find themselves reacting to problems rather than getting ahead of them. It's terra incognita, a place no one expected to visit.

Every day brings another financial horror show, as if Stephen King were channeling Alan Greenspan to produce scary stories full of negative numbers. One weekend, the Federal Government swallows two gigantic mortgage companies and dumps more than $5 trillion — yes, with a t — of the firms' debt onto taxpayers, nearly doubling the amount Uncle Sam owes to his lenders. While we're trying to get our heads around what amounts to the biggest debt transfer since money was created, Lehman Brothers goes broke, and Merrill Lynch feels compelled to shack up with Bank of America to avoid a similar fate. Then, having sworn off bailouts by letting Lehman fail and wiping out its shareholders, the Treasury and the Fed reverse course for an $85 billion rescue of creditors and policyholders of American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance company. Other once impregnable institutions may disappear or be gobbled up.

The scariest thing to average folk: one of the nation's biggest money-market mutual funds, the Reserve Primary, announced that it's going to give investors less than 100 cent on each dollar invested because it got stuck with Lehman securities it now considers worthless. If you can't trust your money fund, what can you trust? To use a technical term to describe this turmoil: yechhh!

There are two ways to look at this. There's Wall Street's way, which features theories and numbers and equations and gobbledygook and, ultimately, rationalization (as in, "How were we supposed to know that people who lied about their income and assets would walk away from mortgages on houses in which they had no equity? That wasn't in our computer model. It's not our fault"). Then there's the right way, which involves asking the questions that really matter: How did we get here? How do we get out of it? And what does all this mean for the average joe? So take a deep breath and bear with us as we try to explain how financial madness overtook not only Wall Street but also Main Street. And why, in the end, almost all of us, collectively, are going to pay for the consequences.

Going forward, there's one particularly creepy thing to keep in mind. In normal times, problems in the economy cause problems in the financial markets because hard-pressed consumers and businesses have trouble repaying their loans. But this time — for the first time since the Great Depression — problems in the financial markets are slowing the economy rather than the other way around. If the economy continues to spiral down, that could cause a second dip in the financial system — and we're having serious trouble dealing with the first one.

The Roots of the Problem

How did this happen, and why over the past 14 months have we suddenly seen so much to fear? Think of it as payback. Fear is so pervasive today because for years the financial markets — and many borrowers — showed no fear at all. Wall Streeters didn't have to worry about regulation, which was in disrepute, and they didn't worry about risk, which had supposedly been magically whisked away by all sorts of spiffy nouveau products — derivatives like credit-default swaps. (More on those later.) This lack of fear became a hothouse of greed and ignorance on Wall Street — and on Main Street as well. When greed exceeds fear, trouble follows. Wall Street has always been a greedy place and every decade or so it suffers a blow resulting in a bout of hand-wringing and regret, which always seems to be quickly forgotten.

This latest go-round featured hedge-fund operators, leveraged-buyout boys (who took to calling themselves "private-equity firms") and whiz-kid quants who devised and plugged in those new financial instruments, creating a financial Frankenstein the likes of which we had never seen. Great new fortunes were made, and with them came great new hubris. The newly minted masters of the universe even had the nerve to defend their ridiculous income tax break — much of the private-equity managers' piece of their investors' profits is taxed at the 15% capital-gains rate rather than at the normal top federal income tax rate of 35% — as being good for society. ("Hey, we're creating wealth — cut us some slack.")

The Root of the Problems

Warren Buffett, the nation's most successful investor, back in 2003 called these derivatives — which it turned out almost no one understood — "weapons of financial mass destruction." But what did he know? He was a 70-something alarmist fuddy-duddy who had cried wolf for years. No reason to worry about wolves until you hear them howling at your door, right?

Besides a few prescient financial sages, though, who could have seen this coming in the fall of 2006, when things were booming and the world was awash in cheap money? There was little fear of buying a house with nothing down, because housing prices, we were assured, only go up. And there was no fear of making mortgage loans, because what analysts call "house-price appreciation" would increase the value of the collateral if borrowers couldn't or wouldn't pay. The idea that we'd have house-price depreciation — average house prices in the top 20 markets are down 15%, according to the S&P Case-Shiller index — never entered into the equation.

As for businesses, there was money available to buy corporations or real estate or whatever an inspired dealmaker wanted to buy. It was safe too — or so Wall Street claimed — because investors worldwide were buying U.S. financial products, thus spreading risk around the globe.

Now, though, we're seeing the downside of this financial internationalization. Many of the mortgages and mortgage securities owned or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were bought by foreign central banks, which wanted to own dollar-based securities that carried slightly higher interest rates than boring old U.S. Treasury securities. A big reason the Fed and Treasury felt compelled to bail out Fannie and Freddie was the fear that if they didn't, foreigners wouldn't continue funding our trade and federal-budget deficits.

You've heard, of course, that subprime mortgages — subprime is Wall Street's euphemism for junk — are where the problems started. That's true, but the problems have now spread way beyond them. Those predicting that the housing hiccup wouldn't be a big deal — what's a few hundred billion in crummy mortgage loans compared with a $13 trillion U.S. economy or a $54 trillion world economy? — failed to grasp that possibility. It turned out that Wall Street's greed — and by Wall Street, we mean the world of money and investments, not a geographic area in downtown Manhattan — was supplemented by ignorance. Folks in the world of finance created, bought, sold and traded securities that were too complex for them to fully understand. (Try analyzing a CDO-squared sometime. Good luck.)

For an example in our backyard, consider Lehman Brothers. Lehman was so flush, or at least felt so flush, that in May 2007 it sublet 12 prime midtown-Manhattan floors of the Time & Life Building — across the street from Lehman headquarters — from Time Inc., which publishes this magazine. Lehman signed on for $350 million over 10 years. (It's not clear what kind of hit, if any, Time Inc. will now face.)

Lehman's fall shows the downside of using borrowed money. Even though Lehman has a 158-year-old name, it's actually a 14-year-old company that was spun off by American Express in 1994. AmEx had gobbled it up 10 years earlier, and it wasn't in prime shape when AmEx spat it out. To compensate for its relatively small size and skinny capital base, Lehman took risks that proved too large. To keep profits growing, Lehman borrowed huge sums relative to its size. Its debts were about 35 times its capital, far higher than its peer group's ratio. And it plunged heavily into real estate ventures that cratered.

Here's how leverage works in reverse. When things go well, as they did until last year, Lehman is immensely profitable. If you borrow 35 times your capital and those investments rise only 1%, you've made 35% on your money. If, however, things move against you — as they did with Lehman — a 1% or 2% drop in the value of your assets puts your future in doubt. The firm increasingly relied on investments in derivatives to produce profits, in essence creating a financial arms race with competitors like Goldman Sachs. Even though the Fed had set up a special borrowing program for Lehman and other investment banks after the forced sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase in March, the market ultimately lost faith in Lehman. So out it went.

Uncle Sam Steps Back In

The market lost faith in AIG too, but the government was forced to save it. A major reason is that AIG is one of the creators of the aforementioned credit-default swaps. What are those, you ask? They're pixie-dust securities that supposedly offer insurance against a company defaulting on its obligations. If you buy $10 million of GM bonds, for instance, you might hedge your bet by buying a $10 million CDS from AIG. In return for that premium — which changes day to day — AIG agrees to give you $10 million should GM have an "event of default" on its obligations.

But as a way to make sure that swap meisters can make good on their obligations, they have to post collateral. If their credit is downgraded — as was the case with AIG — they have to post more collateral. What put AIG on the brink was that it had to post $14 billion overnight, which of course it didn't have lying around. Next week, the looming downgrades might have forced it to come up with $250 billion. (No, that's not a typographical mistake; it's a real number.) Hence the action. If AIG croaked, all the players who thought they had their bets hedged would suddenly have "unbalanced books." That could lead to firms other than AIG failing, which could lead to still more firms failing, which could lead to what economists call "systemic failure." Or, in plain terms, a financial death spiral in which firms suck one another into the abyss.

AIG, like Lehman, was ultimately done in by credit-rating agencies, of all things. The main credit raters — Moody's and Standard & Poor's — had blithely assigned top-drawer AAA and AA ratings to all sorts of hinky mortgage securities and other financial esoterica without understanding the risks involved. Would you know how to rate a collateralized loan obligation? Or commercial-mortgage-backed securities? Sophisticated investors took Moody's and S&P's word for it, and it turned out that the agencies didn't know what they were doing. Credit raters, who claim to offer only opinions, are party to Wall Street's cycles too. At the beginning, they're far too lenient with borrowers, who are the ones who pay their rating fees. Then, after a couple of embarrassments — remember Enron and WorldCom? — the raters tighten up, maybe too much. Then memory fades, and the cycle repeats.

What doomed AIG was the rating agencies' decision — they had suddenly awakened to AIG's problems — to sharply downgrade the firm's securities. That gave AIG no time to react, no time to raise more capital, no more time to do anything else but beg for help. Because AIG is in a much scarier situation than Lehman — the insurer has assets of $1 trillion, more than 70 million customers and intimate back-and-forth dealings with many of the world's biggest and most important financial firms — Uncle Sam felt that it had no choice but to intervene.

Right before the markets began to unravel last year, Lloyd Blankfein, chief executive of Goldman Sachs, presciently quipped that he hadn't "felt this good since 1998," referring to the Wall Street wipeout precipitated that year by Russia's defaulting on its ruble debt. Blankfein argued that confidence in global markets had built up to a dangerously giddy level and that investors weren't being compensated for assuming outsize risk in securities like esoteric bonds and Chinese stocks. Blankfein was right, of course, but even he wasn't paranoid enough. Though Goldman stands, along with Morgan Stanley, as one of the last two giant U.S. investment banks not to collapse (as Lehman and Bear Stearns have) or be sold (à la Merrill Lynch), Goldman too has been pummeled. The firm's quarterly profit plunged 70% — results considered to be relatively good. While analysts generally believe that Goldman and Morgan Stanley will survive the meltdown, that view is not unanimous. Says doomster New York University economics professor Nouriel Roubini: "They will be gone in a matter of months as well. It's better if Goldman or Morgan Stanley find a buyer, because their business model is fundamentally flawed." Both firms would beg to disagree, but their stock prices have been hammered.

All of us are now paying the price for Wall Street's excesses. Some of the cost is being paid by prudent people, like retirees who have saved all their life. They're now getting ridiculously low rates of 2% or so on their savings because the Federal Reserve has cut short-term rates in an attempt to goose the economy and reassure financial markets. Taxpayers are going to get stuck too. By the estimate of William Poole, former head of the St. Louis Fed, bailing out the creditors of the two big mortgage firms, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, could cost taxpayers $300 billion. Think of that as about a year and a half in Iraq.

Didn't the folks on Wall Street, who are nothing if not smart, know that someday the music would end? Sure. But they couldn't help behaving the way they did because of Wall Street's classic business model, which works like a dream for Wall Street employees (during good times) but can be a nightmare for the customers. Here's how it goes. You bet big with someone else's money. If you win, you get a huge bonus, based on the profits. If you lose, you lose someone else's money rather than your own, and you move on to the next job. If you're especially smart — like Lehman chief executive Dick Fuld — you take a lot of money off the table. During his tenure as CEO, Fuld made $490 million (before taxes) cashing in stock options and stock he received as compensation. A lot of employees, whose wealth was tied to the company's stock, were financially eviscerated when Lehman bombed. But Fuld is unlikely to show up applying for food stamps.

Fuld is done with the grueling job of trying to stave off financial crisis. Not so for regulators, of course. It's difficult to imagine the pressure and stress. Key players such as Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and New York Fed chief Tim Geithner have been working around the clock for weeks now, putting out fire after fire. Besides having to comprehend and solve the mind-bending financial woes of some of the world's biggest companies, they are also briefing and seeking counsel from CEOs of the surviving companies, never mind President George W. Bush and the two presidential candidates, plus central bankers from around the globe.

Where Do We Go from Here?

There's no question that the crisis has gone so deep that it cannot be halted by one stroke. Banks and other financial companies around the globe are struggling to pull themselves out of this mess. Rebuilding will take time, vast amounts of money and constant attention. Sooner or later, the hundreds of billions (or trillions) of dollars that the Fed and other central bankers are throwing into the markets will stabilize things. Sooner or later, housing prices will stop falling because no financial trend continues forever.

Given that this is a political year and change is the buzzword, how do Barack Obama and John McCain intend to see us out of this mess? Good question. We don't know, and it's not at all clear that they've thought about it in greater than sound-bite depth.

Obama has called for increased regulation, which seems like a no-brainer, but he hasn't articulated many specifics. Meanwhile, McCain has talked about ending "wild speculation" and railed against Wall Street greed. Well, duh. Know anyone who is in favor of naked greed? Whoever wins will face a massive job of righting the financial ship and restoring confidence that has been badly shaken. The next President will have to cast away partisan predispositions and add the just-right measure of regulation and oversight to the mix. As Treasury Secretary (and former Goldman Sachs chief executive) Paulson recently said, "Raw capitalism is dead."

Whatever the politicians do, we as a society are going to be poorer than we were. We've lost credibility with foreigners; they will be less likely than before to lend us endless amounts of cheap money. Will that ultimately lead to higher borrowing costs? It's hard to see how it won't.

Coping in this new world will require adjustments by millions of Americans. We all will have to start living within our means — or preferably below them. If you don't overborrow or overspend, you're far less vulnerable to whatever problems the financial system may have. And remember one other thing: the four most dangerous words in the world for your financial health are "This time, it's different." It's never different. It's always the same, but with bigger numbers.
(Additional photo credits -- Paulson: AP; AIG Ticker: Andrew Harrer / Bloomberg / Landov; Lehman: Getty; Federal Reserve Bank of New York: AP; Foreclosure: AP; AIP sign: Getty; Dow Jones: AP)

Saturday, February 3, 2007

Are Controls on International Capital Flows a useful Instrument of Economic Policy?





In his famous ‘Open’ Letter to the Malaysian Prime Minister Mr. Mahathir, Paul Krugman wrote,



“Currency controls are a risky, stopgap measure, but some gaps desperately need to be stopped.” (Krugman, 1998)


His view comes as a response to the debate between supporters and opponents of capital controls and even though the critics of such controls may disagree, it appears from various arguments and empirical studies that controls on international capital flows may just prove to be a useful instrument of economic policy. Despite the IMF waving its neoclassical ideology flag to encourage financial liberalisation (including removal of all capital controls), there are quite a few who argue that “…the weight of evidence and the force of logic point in the opposite direction, toward restraints on capital flows. It is time to shift the burden of proof from those who oppose to those who favour liberated capital.” (Bhagwati, 1998)



If one may delve into the history of capital controls, it is discovered that the modern capital controls emerged into picture in World War I to finance wartime expenditures by maintaining a tax base; but they began to disappear after the war, before re-emerging during the Great Depression of the 1930s – their purpose being to reflate the economies of the affected countries without the danger of capital flight. (Neely, 1999, p. 13) In fact, the Bretton Woods System insisted solely on current account convertibility but allowed controls on international flows of capital. All this began to change with the establishment of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961. The articles of OECD embraced capital account liberalisation, and based on the same there was a gradual easing of capital controls in those countries in 1960s, though some new controls were also introduced at the same time. Meanwhile, capital controls had been widely used in Less Developed Countries (LDCs), the same being a crucial part of Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) strategies, especially in Latin America and Asia. With the IMF beginning to strongly encourage all countries to liberalise in the late 1980s/early 1990s, some of the controls began to phase out. So strong was the IMF’s commitment to financial liberalisation that at the IMF Interim Committee Meeting in Hong Kong in April 1997, it was proposed to amend the IMF’s Articles to add a chapter on capital account convertibility, i.e. making capital account liberalisation a central part of its mandate. Owing to the South East Asian Crisis barely a few months later, the proposal not only faced a set-back before its implementation; but a little more than a year and a new round of meetings later the mood is very different, and the merits of a liberalized capital account, along with a long list of competing proposals for a new international financial architecture, are being actively debated once again. (McHale, 2005) The reason being that the countries with capital controls, like China, India (and subsequently Malaysia), were virtually insulated from this crisis.



There are a number of theoretical arguments put forth by the neoclassical economists citing benefits of capital account liberalisation. These theoretical models have identified a number of direct and indirect channels through which embracing international financial integration can help enhance economic growth in developing countries. With respect to the direct channels, it is argued that financial globalisation promotes growth by augmenting domestic savings (by way of increased investment in capital-poor countries while providing a higher return on capital than is available in capital-rich countries and thereby reducing the risk-free rate in the developing countries), reducing the cost of capital through better global allocation of risk (first, by increasing risk-sharing opportunities between foreign and domestic investors; second, by increasing the ability of the firms to diversify risks, thereby encouraging them to take more total investment; last, by introducing liquidity in the domestic stock market, further reducing the equity risk premium), effecting transfer of technological and managerial know-how (which have the potential to generate technology spillovers), stimulating domestic financial sector development (resulting from the increased liquidity of the domestic stock market due to international portfolio flows and various benefits of increased foreign ownership of domestic banks). Indirectly, financial liberalisation promotes specialisation (by helping the countries to engage in international risk sharing), encourages commitment to better economic policies (as the disciplining role of financial integration could change the dynamics of domestic investment in an economy to the extent that it leads to a reallocation of capital toward more productive activities in response to changes in macroeconomic policies), and signalises that it is going to practice more friendly policies toward foreign investment in the future. (Prasad et. al., 2003, pp. 13-14) These ideas, nevertheless, rest on a few assumptions, namely, (1) Resources are fully employed (else the countries would be more concerned about getting their resources fully employed rather than their reallocation from inefficient to efficient sectors); (2) Capital flows do not stand in the way of attaining full employment (in reality, however, capital flows have been observed to result in destabilising markets); and (3) International transfers are governed by long-term return on investment.



Furthermore, Kavaljit Singh explains that “the argument that removal of capital controls will enhance economic efficiency derives from two basic propositions in economic theory – the ‘Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics’ (FTWE) and the ‘Efficient Market Hypothesis’ (EMH). The FTWE deals with the efficiency of the real economy and presumes a perfectly competitive economy with no externalities while EMH portrays that financial markets are efficient gatherers and transmitters of information. Together, they present a picture of economic efficiency being dependent upon free markets for goods, labour and finance, and a minimalist state. In these theoretical propositions, removal of capital controls (which by definition are contemplated as inefficient) is considered beneficial.” This happens to be in perfect consonance with the neo-liberal ideology. (Singh, 2000, p.134)



Although it has been observed that the average per capita income for the group of more financially open (developing) economies grows at a more favourable rate than that of the group of less financially open economies, a few empirical studies have pointed out that there is no strong, robust, and uniform support for the theoretical argument that financial globalization per se delivers a higher rate of economic growth. In fact, some of the countries with capital account liberalization have experienced output collapses related to costly banking or currency crises. (Prasad et. al., 2003, pp. 2-3) As Christopher J. Neely points out, “The benefits of capital flows do not come without a price, however. Because capital flows can complicate economic policy or even be a source of instability themselves, governments have used capital controls to limit their effects.” (Neely, 1999, p. 15)



Joseph Stiglitz has time and again argued that financial markets behave differently from product markets. He has emphasised that the financial markets are characterised with the problems of asymmetric information, and hence, in reality, behave not like the way propagated by the theoretical models. Keynes, on the other hand, has criticised the price formation in the EMH, stating that markets are generally driven by herd behaviour and second guessing the market (like in a ‘beauty parade’) is commonplace. Furthermore, financial markets are prone to cumulative disequilibrium i.e. if in financial markets the price is falling, of a currency for example, then the people will sell the same to prevent themselves from holding something that has no value – unlike product markets, where other things being equal, if prices come down then people buy more of the commodity. Moreover, the post-keynesian economists contend that flexible exchange rates and free capital flows are not yet compatible with full employment and rapid growth.



Many economists, like Jagdish Bhagwati, feel that there is a huge difference between ‘Free Trade’ and ‘Free Capital Mobility’ and hence arguing for free capital mobility with the same arguments used for free trade is inappropriate. In Bhagwati’s words, “… when we penetrate the fog of implausible assertions that surrounds the case for free capital mobility, we realize that the idea and the ideology of free trade and its benefits – and this extends to the continuing liberalization of trade in goods and financial and other services at the World Trade Organization – have, in effect, been hijacked by the proponents of capital mobility… The pretty face presented to us is, in fact, a mask that hides the warts and wrinkles underneath.” (Bhagwati, 1998) Rodrik (1998), in his article ‘Who needs Capital-account Convertibility?’, looks at the South East Asian financial crises and presses upon the idea that financial markets are much too volatile to embrace liberalisation of capital accounts. “Keynes once wrote that economics would only be successful if economists had the same ability as dentists to address and solve practical problems. Well, here LDCs are faced with a practical economic problem if ever there was one: how to live with a liberated capital account, in a world with an already high, rapidly expanding, ever more volatile, and practically unregulated financial liquidity.” (Palma, 2002)



A potent way to counter these problems is by imposing controls on capital flows. Singh argues that “if effectively used as an integral part of a strategy of state intervention in conjunction with other complementary policy measures, capital controls can be beneficial to the economies in several ways.” He discusses some important objectives of capital controls and their desired benefits. First, according to him, capital controls are the only effective and meaningful tools to protect and insulate the domestic economy from volatile capital flows and other negative external developments; especially in the wake of domestic countries’ experience with rapid capital flight, depletion of foreign exchange reserves and loss of autonomy in monetary policy. Second, he contends that some kind of social control over capital is desirable as well as critical; owing to the importance of capital for development for the enhancement of domestic savings and its direction (along with foreign borrowings) into productive domestic investment in accordance with their developmental plans. Third, capital controls help the countries to attain the bargaining power and assert its power during negotiations with their own private sector, foreign capital and multilateral financial institutions. Fourth, the governments can maintain the desired level of foreign reserves and channelise the terms of trade (in order to protect domestic products from international competition) by influencing the exchange rate. Fifth, capital controls are especially significant for developing countries because it helps them save foreign exchange for debt servicing, imports and capital goods. (Singh, 2000, pp. 135-139)



Among these the most cited benefit of capital controls is naturally their ability to protect an economy from the devastating financial crises. “The financial crises, which surfaced in Southeast Asia and East Asia with Russia and Brazil as the most recent casualties, have dampened the enthusiasm for capital account liberalization. The most advanced developing countries, which are an integral part of the process of globalization, have been ravaged by such crises.” (Nayyar, 2000) Hence, one may say that the experience of many financially integrated economies with the destabilizing capital flows, time and again leading to financial crises, has strengthened the case for capital controls. “Like cats, crises have many lives, and macroeconomists, never a tribe that enjoyed a great reputation for getting things right or for agreeing among themselves, have been kept busy adding to the taxonomy of crises and their explanations. None of the solutions currently propounded can really rid the system of free capital mobility of instability.” (Bhagwati, 1998)



Neely points out that “the conventional wisdom of the economics profession has been – whatever the problems with destabilizing capital flows or fixed exchange rates – that capital controls are ineffective and impose substantial costs on economies that outweigh any benefits. That generalization ignores distinctions among types of capital controls and varied criteria for success, however. Capital controls have many potential purposes and thus many potential standards by which to judge their efficacy.” (Neely, 1999, p. 26) So, there are Administrative Controls that range from prohibitive controls, to quantitative limits, to discretionary rules; and then there are Market-based Controls which may include dual- or multiple-exchange rates, tax on cross-border capital flows (or on income from foreign assets), indirect taxes (like unremunerated reserves), and regulatory controls on banks. Capital controls are also often classified as Quantity-based controls (involving explicit limits or prohibitions on capital account transactions); Price-based controls (seeking to alter the cost of capital transactions with a view to discouraging a certain class of flows and encouraging another set of flows); or Regulatory controls (which can be both price-based or quantity-based – this policy package usually treats non-residents less favourably than the residents e.g. unremunerated reserve requirement). (Singh, 2000, p. 122; Neely, 1999, p. 23) Still another way to classify controls is ‘Controls on Inflows’ as against ‘Controls on Outflows’. (Neely, 1999, p. 22) Whereas the former are often imposed to change the nature of capital flowing in the country (say, to encourage long-term flows while discouraging short-term flows; or, for example, in India foreign investment is prohibited in real estate); the latter are often used to prevent capital flight in case a crisis knocks at the country’s door (e.g. Malaysia after the South East Asian crisis).



However, even the advocates of capital controls might admit that they do not come without a price. Although they are often evaded, even successfully at times, they impose substantial costs in subduing international trade in assets. Most notable among these costs are confining the benefits of capital flows: risk-sharing, diversification, growth, and technology transfer. Capital controls are believed to be even more harmful when they are used to defend inconsistent policies that produce an overvalued currency. Poorly designed or administered capital controls can even adversely affect direct investment and the ordinary financing of trade deals and not to mention that controls can worsen the problem of destabilizing capital flows (as acknowledged by the Korean government with respect to restriction on offshore borrowing by Korean corporations). Evasion of controls encourages corruption and imposes administrative costs on the governments. (Neely, 1999, pp. 27-28)



The critics of capital controls further argue that capital liberalisation, as opposed to controls, promotes higher growth (though this argument is not sufficiently supported by evidence). Furthermore, they impress upon the fact that there are problems of evasion and implementation of capital controls. Though it may be counter-argued that this does not mean that one should abolish controls – as it is with criminal law, if people get around the law and commit crimes, it does not prove to be good enough reasons to do away with the law – rather one should improvise them. At this point, one might say that the conventional economic theories often tend to overplay the downside of capital controls while totally underplaying their benefits. Although Keynesian theory recognises the advantages of state intervention and capital controls (the experience of the Great Depression led Keynes to argue, “above all, let finance be primarily national.”), it considers these controls as ‘second-best’ solution. It justifies the use of such channels only as emergency measures to be used for short duration when the governments face specific problems. (Singh, 2000, pp. 125 ff.) “In this world of already high, rapidly growing, extremely volatile, and almost totally unregulated international liquidity, capital controls can, of course, be of some help; but one cannot expect them to be able to hold the fort on their own!” (Palma, 2002) Even Dani Rodrik reasons, “It is not that capital controls are necessarily the answer to [these] problems; they are not. But capital-account liberalisation fits the bill even less.” (Rodrik, 1998)



The debate among the proponents of capital controls and the opponents of the same clearly has no victors as both cases have advantages and disadvantages. However, controls on international capital flows do appear to be lesser of the two evils, especially after the experience of more financially integrated economies with the financial crises. This has even prompted IMF’s economic counsellor Kenneth Rogoff to admit that even though he favours capital market integration, nevertheless the countries embracing the same should keep an open mind but not a blind eye to the dangers that come as part of the package. “Hard work remains to be done on capital account liberalisation and its sequencing with other policies to find the point at which the benefits to further capital market integration stop exceeding the costs… making sure that financial market liberalisation does not get too far ahead of trade liberalisation” (Rogoff, 2002) Therefore, as is apparent from this statement, the IMF, though it has not shifted from its pro-financial liberalisation policy, is not any more encouraging the ‘big-bang’ method of financial integration. Many authors now favour tackling of fiscal imbalances first and attaining a minimal degree of macroeconomic stability during the early process of reform process. They also agree that the capital account should be liberalised only after the domestic financial sector has been reformed and the liberalisation of trade in goods has been consolidated. “At practical policy level the debate has centered, not so much on whether capital controls should be eliminated, but on when and how fast this should be done. This discussion has come to be known as the ‘sequencing and speed of reform debate’.” (Edwards, 1999, pp. 66-67) Hence, one may presume this to be a sort of compromise emerging between the two groups debating this issue with both sides neither conceding defeat nor emerging as clear winners.



Refrences:

Bhagwati, Jagdish. The Capital Myth: The Difference between Trade in Widgets and Dollars, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 3, May-June 1998.

Edwards, Sebastian. How effective are capital controls?, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13, No. 4, Fall 1999.

Evans, Trevor. Lecture Notes, Financial Institutions and Development, MIDE Program (WS05-06) at FHTW, Berlin, January 23, 2006.

Krugman, Paul. An Open Letter to Prime Minister Mahathir, September 1, 1998.

McHale, John. Capital Controls and Crisis Management, NBER Website, December 16, 2005. (http://www.nber.org/crisis/capital_report.html)

Nayyar, Deepak. Capital Controls and the World Financial Authority: What can we learn from the Indian Experience?, in John Eatwell, Lance Taylor ed. ‘International Capital Markets: Systems in Transition’, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Neely, Christopher J. An Introduction to Capital Controls, Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, November/December 1999.

Palma, Gabriel. The Three Routes to Financial Crises: The need for Capital Controls, in John Eatwell, Lance Taylor ed. ‘International Capital Markets: Systems in Transition’, Oxford University Press, 2002.

Prasad, Eswar; Kenneth Rogoff; Shang-Jin Wei; and M. Ayhan Kose. Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence, IMF, 2003.


Rodrik, Dani. Who Needs Capital-Account Convertibility?, in P.B. Kenen ed. ‘Should the IMF Pursue Capital-Account Convertibility?’, Princeton: Essays in International Finance, No. 207, May 1998.


Rogoff, Kenneth. Rethinking Capital Controls: When should we keep an Open Mind, Finance and Development, Vol. 39, No. 4, December 2002.


Singh, Kavaljit. Taming Global Financial Flows: A Citizen’s Guide, Zed Books Ltd., 2000.

International Monetary System

Does the international monetary system require major reform? Discuss by drawing on the experience of the post-war Bretton Woods international monetary system and the system that has existed since the 1970s.

“All is well that ends,” said William Simon jokingly at the cocktail party that followed the conclusion of the Jamaica Accords in 1976, probably expressing the despondency of the members at failing to evolve a full-fledged, comprehensive reform of the International Monetary System guaranteeing the stability of the Classical Gold Standard and/or the Bretton Woods System and liquidising the problems of the same which had arisen with respect to changed scenarios. What followed was a system of Flexible Exchange Rates whereby the governments were permitted to intervene to smoothen the fluctuations, but not to influence the underlying value of exchange rates. Clement Rohee, the then Foreign Minister of Guyana and the chairman of the G-77, had described the current system in 1999 as “severely flawed.” So, it’s not surprising that the calls for major reforms are often heard in the economic, political and financial circles. The more recent history of the world monetary system shows, however, that it is easier said than done, for it is not only hard to reach consensus on its successes and failures, but equally difficult is to agree on the reforms required, and, eventually, get sound ideas put into practice. Robert A. Mundell has appropriately described the current situation in the following words,

“For thousands of years countries have anchored their currencies to one of the precious metals or to another currency. But in the quarter century since the international monetary system broke down, countries have been on their own, a phenomenon that has no historical precedent in the cooperative game known as the international monetary system.”[1]

The International Gold Standard, the first stable international monetary system that existed prior to the outbreak of the First World War, was characterised by the value of each currency being fixed in terms of weight of gold (‘gold parity’). It relied on the international economic, financial and military pre-eminence, i.e. ‘hegemony’ of Britain; which furnished the basis for rapid growth of international trade and investment. However, after Britain’s failed attempts in the inter-war period to re-establish the gold system and destabilising consequences of the world economic crisis in 1929, the lesson learned was, as Harry Dexter White, the principal architect of the Bretton Woods system, expressed:

“…the absence of a high degree of economic collaboration among the leading nations will... inevitably result in economic warfare that will be but the prelude and instigator of military warfare on an even vaster scale.”[2]

Hence, the decision makers were wise enough to sit together after the Second World War to establish a new monetary order in 1943. At Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, evolved a new international system which constituted the embodiment of the economic principles enunciated by President Roosevelt, represented by Harry Dexter White, and Prime Minister Churchill, represented by John Meynard Keynes, while 42 other countries played mute partakers. However, all the participating governments at Bretton Woods agreed that the monetary chaos of the interwar period had yielded several valuable lessons. A high level of agreement among the dignitaries on the goals and means of international economic management facilitated the decisions reached by the Bretton Woods Conference. The foundation of that agreement, which came to be known as the “Bretton Woods Agreement”, was a shared belief in capitalism.

The political base for the Bretton Woods system is enrooted in the confluence of several key conditions: the shared experiences of the Great Depression, the concentration of power in a small number of states, and the presence of a dominant power willing and able to assume a leadership role. It ventured to secure the advantages of the gold standard without its disadvantages. Thus, a compromise was sought between the polar alternatives of either freely floating or irrevocably fixed rates – an arrangement to gain the expediencies of both without suffering the drawbacks of either, while retaining the right to revise currency values on occasion as circumstances warranted. Since at the time United States accounted for over half of the world's manufacturing capacity and held most of the world’s gold, the leaders decided to tie world currencies to the dollar (‘par value’), which, in turn, they agreed should be convertible into gold at $35 per ounce (‘gold exchange standard’). Hence, being a system based on stable and adjustable exchange rates, it was an obligation for each country to adopt a monetary policy that maintained the exchange rate of its currency within a fixed value – plus or minus one percent – in terms of gold. Therefore, when a nation was faced with a chronic Balance of Payments deficit, deflationary policies were no longer a must. So, the adjustable peg was viewed as a vast improvement over the gold standard with fixed parity. Currencies were convertible into gold, but unlike the gold standard, countries had the ability to change par values. For this reason, Keynes described the Bretton Woods system as “the exact opposite of the gold standard.”

The delegates at Bretton Woods sought to establish a post-war international monetary system of convertible currencies, fixed exchange rates and free trade. To facilitate these objectives, the agreement created two international institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank). The Bretton Woods Agreement was also aimed at preventing currency competition and promoting monetary co-operation among nations. Hence, the primary task for the IMF was to oversee fixed exchange-rate system. Exchange rate changes were allowed under the system, i.e. ‘adjustable peg’, but only with the approval of the IMF. Also, the system facilitated unrestricted current account transactions but inoculated controls on international capital flows. Therefore, the IMF was also charged with the responsibility to provide finance to bridge temporary payments imbalances by providing short-term loans to members with Balance of Payments deficit.

Since the U.S. dollar functioned as the international money, it served as the principal “reserve currency”. Meanwhile, in order to bolster faith in the dollar, the United States committed itself to convert foreign official dollar reserves for gold at the rate of $35 per ounce of gold. Hence, the dollar was now “as good as gold” and the U.S. currency was now effectively the world currency. Although current account convertibility could be implemented by developed countries only by 1958-59, followed by accelerated growth of international trade in 1960s, it was more or less a stable fixed exchange rate system and the exchange rate realignments were minor and infrequent.

The problem with using U.S. dollars as the ‘lead currency’ was that its supply was determined as a by-product of the United States’ Balance of Payments. So as long as the U.S. experienced huge trade surpluses, it functioned smoothly. With a continuous rise in the overseas aid and military expenditure along with overseas direct investments in Canada, the United States experienced a gradual fall in its trade surplus and the emergence of a small overall Balance of Payments deficit in the 1950s. There were fears of the slowdown of the process of international trade as the rest of the world received very little of the currency required by them. Postwar world capitalism suffered from a huge ‘dollar shortage’. The United States was running huge balance of trade surplus, and the U.S. reserves were immense and growing. It was necessary to reverse this flow. There were discussions regarding introduction of a new form of international money in the form of ‘Special Drawing Rights’ by IMF, which, due to United States’ disfavour, was a classic case of too little too late (as it could materialize only in small quantities in 1970-71). By 1960s though, due to declining trade surplus of United States, faced with competition from Western Europe and Japan, and at the same time the growing Balance of Payments deficit, the reverse flow was realized. Further, increasing overseas military expenditure (Vietnam War) and rising overseas direct investment (mainly in Europe) gave rise to a dollar ‘glut’. Therefore, the foreign official reserves of dollars exceeded the U.S. reserves of gold.

Although United States tried to restrict capital outflows by measures such as ‘voluntary investment restraints’ (1965), it only gave rise to Euro-dollar markets i.e. bank lending in U.S. dollars in London. As the pressure on dollars continued in late 1960s, France chose to be on the safe side and sell dollars for gold. This was a big blow to the mounting pressure on dollar as it could lead other countries to follow suit and ultimately put United States at the receiving end of astronomical demand for gold reserves which it was unable to furnish all at once. Although West Germany agreed not to purchase gold from the U.S., in return for a promise to maintain its military defence, the speculations for devaluation of dollar against gold gained ground. In 1968, on United States’ request, Britain suspended free market for gold, ‘London Gold Pool’, but to not much use. The Bretton Woods system finally ended on August 15, 1971 when U.S. President Nixon unilaterally ended the convertibility of dollar for gold leaving the other countries stuck with huge dollar foreign official reserves and thrusting them onto a ‘dollar system’. In short, the United States’ failure to adjust exchange rates, its expansive monetary and fiscal policy, the growth of international capital flows, and the decline in U.S. hegemony, all together led to the demise of the Bretton Woods System.

The shock of August 15 was followed by efforts under U.S. leadership to develop a new system of international monetary management. In December 1971, the G-10, meeting in the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, created the Smithsonian Agreement which devalued the dollar to $38 an ounce of gold and revalued Deutsch Marks and Yen, with 2.25% trading bands. It was criticized at the time, and was by design a “temporary” agreement. It failed to impose discipline on the U.S. government, and with no other credibility mechanism in place, fixed exchange rates were formally abandoned in March 1973.

The Flexible Exchange Rate system existing since 1973 is difficult to describe. As per Robert A. Mundell, “An international monetary system in the strict sense of the world does not presently exist. Every country has it own system… The present international monetary system neither manages the interdependence of currencies nor stabilizes prices.”[3] The exchange rates are determined by the supply and demand in foreign exchange markets. Since, most of the countries found themselves forsaken with huge dollar reserves, the U.S. dollar continued to function as a principal form of international money. When governments met at the ‘Jamaica Accords’ and agreed on intervention only to smoothen fluctuations in the foreign exchange markets without influencing the underlying value of exchange rates, the theoretical debate between Neo-classical Economists and Keynesian Economists, respectively in favour of and against flexible exchange rates, surfaced.

“Under flexible exchange rates the effects of terms-of-trade shocks on growth are approximately one half that under pegged regimes.”[4]

The Neo-classical economists believe that ‘market knows best’. For them exchange rates are just another price; hence, flexible exchange rates are nothing but an automatic mechanism for equilibrating the balance of payments. Their analysis was basically based on trade/current account, i.e. if a country has a trade deficit; it essentially means that it is buying more than what the rest of the world is buying from it, therefore, its exchange rate falls resulting in exports becoming cheaper and consequent elimination of trade deficit. However, the neo-classical economists ignored the growth of international capital flows which emerged in 1970s in the form of international banking and later in 1980s in the form of international portfolio investment. This led Keynesian Economists to argue that since the foreign exchange transactions are dominated by capital flows, the markets behave akin to asset markets. Hence, the exchange rate instability leads to great uncertainty further leading to a slower growth of international trade. In fact, the international trade has indeed grown more slowly since 1973 than before it.

However, the current system is neither a rigid fixed exchange rate system nor a floating exchange rate system. So, as Robert Blecker points out,

“What has emerged in the quarter century since that time is not a pure system of floating rates, but a hybrid system: several major currencies (such as the dollar, the yen, the euro) are floating, while many individual countries have adopted various forms of managed exchange rates, ranging from rigidly fixed rates to crawling (frequently adjusted) pegs to dirty floats (floats with occasional intervention) to joint floats (such as the European ERM prior to January 1, 1999).”[5]

So, while the United States follows a policy of ‘benign neglect’ i.e. allowing the market forces to determine exchange rates and intervene temporarily and only when the results threaten its financial stability, whereas the European Union has formed a European Monetary System (March 1979) to follow a coordinated monetary policy.

The Flexible Exchange Rate System and the concomitant uncertainty and volatility have given voice to the demand for reforms. To put it in the words of Peter Kenen and Alexander K. Swoboda,

“Interest in reforming the international monetary and financial system, like recent capital flows to emerging markets, tends to come in waves. It surges with crises and ebbs when calm returns, even temporarily. Interest in reform has thus surged in recent years, stimulated by the succession of crises that began with the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) crisis of 1992-­93 and continued with the “tequila” crisis of 1994-­95 and, in the span of less than two years, the Asian, Russian, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), and Brazilian crises.”[6]

The fundamental issues are not new, although the specific proposals that are being considered to strengthen the architecture of the international financial system reflect concerns arising from the particular characteristics of the recent crises. So, on one hand, there have been calls for major new international institutions and/or reform in the role of the existing international institutions, especially the IMF, in order to stabilize global financial markets, and on the other hand, vociferations for limitations on international flows of short term capital by a number of measures like ‘Tobin Tax’ on foreign exchange transactions have also arisen. The latter is also in demand to prevent destabilizing inflows and outflows of speculative hot money.

The proposals for reforms mainly focus on the issues of making capital markets work better, and these hypotheses enlist the following as possible interlinked and supportive solution areas, (1) regulating capital flows, (2) reforming international financial institutions; (3) managing exchange rates; and (4) coordinating macroeconomics policies. Among these regulating capital flows and reforming international financial institutions, namely, IMF have gained more support over the years. The Tobin Tax, i.e. a small percentage (about 1% to 0.5%) levy on all foreign exchange transactions, is expected to solve the problems of ‘hot’ money by discouraging the short-term capital movements that have exacerbated exchange rate stability. As regards the IMF, some people believe that it has become redundant since its original function of managing exchange rate stability has come to an end with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Also, with the opening up of international capital markets, developed countries have private capital markets to look up to for funds. Following the Third World debt crisis in 1982, IMF was believed to have found a new role, but it has been severely criticised for its harsh conditionality. Also, its critics have become more vocal ever since the East-Asian Crisis where they believe that IMF made the situation worse than it would have been without its involvement. Hence, the IMF opposition calls for a complete transformation of the organisation into a more responsive and functional institution for global financial management with respect to, (1) replacing the current leadership; (2) opening up its organisational structure to allow for greater accountability and more democratic governance; (3) changing its long-term mission to put more emphasis on macroeconomic prosperity and social justice; and (4) redesigning rescue packages to better meet the needs of individual countries and shift more of the adjustment burden from debtors to creditors.

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems logical that the original ‘gold standard’ was replaced by the ‘gold exchange standard’ after the Second World War, and that this system, in its turn, was abandoned in 1971 when the United States, because of its growing indebtedness to the rest of the world, could no longer guarantee the dollar’s value in gold. The demise came shortly after Robert Triffin’s early warnings about the instability of a global monetary system based on the U.S. dollar (or any other national currency). The past three decades, owing to the growing U.S. Balance of Payments deficit, supply testimony to the inherent problems of a fixed exchange rate system. However, even the current system is flawed with some weaknesses, like serious volatility of exchange rates, dramatic swings in capital markets, harmful uncertainty and misleading signals to private investors and policymakers, as well as a lack of global macroeconomic policy coordination. The quest for reforms is still on. There have been a number of suggestions by learned economists like Stephany Griffith-Jones, Jeffrey Sachs, Henry Kaufman, Catherine Mann, Barry Eichengreen, Giovanni Olivei, Jacquez Mélitz, and others. But, the consensus for a ‘new financial architecture’, which could free the world of the volatile financial flows that have plagued the global economy in recent years, though urgently required, still seem out of bounds.


Refrences:

Trevor Evans, Professor International Economics, MIDE Program (SS05) at FHTW, Berlin; Lecture Notes

Ronald McKinnon, ‘The Rules of the Game: International Money in Historical Perspective’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. XXXI, pp. 1-44

Mica Panic, ‘The Bretton Woods System: Concept and Practice’ in Jonathan Mitchie and John Grieve Smith, Managing the Global Economy, 1995, pp.37-54

Robert E. Blecker, Taming Global Finance, 1999, chapter 3

Other Articles and papers

Peter B. Kenen and Alexander K. Swoboda: “Reforming the International Monetary and Financial System”, Proceedings of a conference held in Washington, DC – May 28-29, 1999 International Monetary Fund, Overview, (© 2000 International Monetary Fund, December 18, 2000)

Tom de Vries, “Jamaica, or the Non-Reform of the International Monetary System”, Foreign Affairs, April 1976

Jan Joost Teunissen (ed.), “Fragile Finance: Rethinking the International Monetary System”, Introduction, 1992

Robert A. Mundell, “Updating the Agenda for Monetary Reform”, Extended version of a luncheon speech presented at the Conference on Optimum Currency Areas, Tel-Aviv University, December 5, 1997

Christopher L. Bach, “Problems of the International Monetary System and Proposals for Reform – 1944-70”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, May 1972, pp. 24-32

Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. Olivei, “Rethinking the International Monetary System: An Overview”, New England Economic Review, November/December 1999

“Flexible Exchange Rates Reduce Economic Volatility”, NBER Website, Thursday, July 28, 2005

C. Fred Bergsten, “Reform of the International Monetary Fund”, Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade and Finance Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, June 7, 2005

Jane D’Arista, “Wanted: Real Reform of the International Monetary System”, FOMC Alert, November-December 1997

“G-77 Chairman Calls for Reform of International Monetary System”, Journal of the Group-77, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 12, 1999

Michael P. Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, Peter Garber, “An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods System”, Working Paper 9971, National Bureau of Economic Research (http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9971.pdf)

Websites:

http://www.globalpolicy.org/

http://www.robertmundell.net/

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/

http://www.imf.org/

http://www.fmcenter.org/

http://www.fondad.org/publications/

http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/

http://www.ejournal.unam.mx/

http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/

http://www.nber.org/digest/

http://www.econ.iastate.edu/

http://en.wikipedia.org/

http://canadianeconomy.gc.ca/english/economy/

http://economics.about.com/

http://papers.nber.org/papers/



[1] Quoted in Robert A. Mundell’s official website: http://www.robertmundell.net/

[2] Quoted in Robert A. Pollard, Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p.8

[3] Quoted in Robert A. Mundell’s official website: http://www.robertmundell.net/

[4] “Flexible Exchange Rates Reduce Economic Volatility”, NBER Website, Thursday, July 28, 2005

[5] Robert E. Blecker, Taming Global Finance, 1999, chapter 3, p. 125

[6] Peter B. Kenen and Alexander K. Swoboda: “Reforming the International Monetary and Financial System”, Proceedings of a conference held in Washington, DC – May 28-29, 1999 International Monetary Fund, Overview, (© 2000 International Monetary Fund, December 18, 2000)

Women should support women

​I was having a discussion today with a junior at work, a girl who I had started interacting with recently. We discuss a lot of work-related...